Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power by Basu, Kaushik
GENDER AND SAY:
A MODEL OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOUR WITH
ENDOGENOUSLY DETERMINED BALANCE OF POWER*
Kaushik Basu
The evidence that the same income can lead to different household decisions, depending on who
the earner is, has led to an effort to replace the standard household model with the  collective
model , which recognises that a household’s decisions depend on the power balance between the
husband and the wife. This article recognises that the power balance can, in turn, depend on the
decisions made. A new  household equilibrium  and its dynamics are described and it is shown that
there can be multiple equilibria in female labour-supply, and that child labour can decline and rise as
the wife’s power increases.
The unitary model of the household, which had served mainstream economics well for
a long time, has in recent times given way to a more fractious view of the household.
This has been an outcome of theoretical advances, empirical investigations and
anthropological insights.
1 It is, for instance, clear that how much say a woman has in
the household can vary across households in the same region and with the same total
income; and this could depend, for example, on how much income she contributes to
the household’s total income.
This recognition has enormous implications for the design of policy. It means that
 how  a certain amount of money is injected by government into households can
inﬂuence the well-being of individuals signiﬁcantly. Ten dollars given to the male head
of the household and the same money given to his wife can have very different
implications for not only the amount of tobacco and alcohol purchased by the
household but on child labour, education and health (Kanbur and Haddad, 1994).
When a series of policy changes in the United Kingdom – see Walker and Zhu (1999)
for a description – from 1976 to 1979 caused the household allowance for children to
be handed over to the women, instead of men, there was a rise in the expenditure on
children’s clothings (Lundberg et al., 1997); for related accounts, see Hoddinott and
Haddad (1995) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999).
2 However to go from this broad
recognition to the actual design of policy one needs to understand the relation
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three anonymous referees for detailed comments and suggestions. The article has also beneﬁted from
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[ 558 ]between household balance of power and household behaviour. There is now a sub-
stantial literature on this, some of which was cited in Footnote 1.
I argue in this article that there is one important lacuna in this new theoretical
literature. While this literature models the impact of household power balance on
household decision making successfully, it tends to ignore the opposite relation – that
is, the effect of household decisions on the balance of power.
3 Modelling both these
relations, simultaneously, requires some theoretical inventiveness, as we shall show
presently. This demonstration forms the core of this article. The next Section
recapitulates the received doctrine and develops the central idea of the article.
Treating this as the core, the article goes on to allow for the realistic possibility that
the decisions that a household takes may inﬂuence the household’s balance of power
with a certain time lag. This is especially so because the story being told here is not one
of negotiation and agreement but the natural and maybe even unwitting inﬂuence of
certain decisions on one’s power. The decision taken by a traditional household to
send the woman out to work would in all likelihood affect the woman’s power but this
happens gradually. So Section 3 goes on to adapt the basic model of the next Section to
one in which there are time-lags involved.
The remaining Sections are best viewed as corollaries – they develop special cases,
draw out the implications of this approach for different areas of economics, such as
female labour supply and child labour, and suggest new directions for empirical
research. I show, for instance, that one consequence of endogenising power is that it
can lead to multiple equilibria in female labour supply. Two societal equilibria, one in
which women work and one in which they do not, can arise from fundamentals (for
example, preferences, technology and wages) which are identical.
1. Household Decision Making: The Main Model
Consider a household with two adults. There may or may not be children in the
household. In the standard  unitary model  of the household, either both adults have
the same preference or one of them takes all the decisions. In any case the upshot is
that the household behaves as if it were a single or a unitary agent (Becker, 1981).
One way of capturing the fact that a household may see cooperation among its
members but nevertheless be fractious is to adopt the  collective approach  to model-
ling the household. This begins with the recognition that each agent – the woman (1)
and the man (2) – has a distinct utility function and the household maximises a
weighted average of these two functions, with the weights capturing the balance of
power in the household.
To develop the model formally, let ui : <n
þ !<be agent i s utility function, where <
is the set of real numbers. The argument x 2< n
þ of the utility function is a vector of n
goods consumed by the household. We can think of a  good  in very general terms. It
includes, for instance, leisure consumed by each person. We also have the option to
think of apples for person 1 as a separate good from apples for person 2.
3 There are a few recent exceptions to this, such as Lundberg and Pollak (2003), Adam et al. (2003) and
Iyigun (2002). These papers take up speciﬁc examples of decisions which have a feedback on the structure of
power.
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X   hu1(x)þ(1   h)u2(x), where h 2 [0,1] captures the balance of power in the house-
hold. As h increases, the power of the wife increases.
4
It is recognised in this model that h may in turn, depend on other variables. If, for
instance, the wage rate for female workers rises, h may rise. If the wife brings a lot of
inherited wealth into the household, h could be higher. In general, we allow 2 to be a
function of prices and wage rates. If this were not the case, the collective model would
be behaviourally indistinguishable from the unitary model.
The value of h may also depend on cultural factors. Let z be the variables which
determine h. Hence, we may write the power function as h(z). In the collective model z
consists of variables exogenous to the household. This innocuous assumption will be
challenged shortly.
5 But let us go along with it for now.
The household’s problem can now be written very simply as follows:
Max hðzÞu1ðxÞþ½ 1   hðzÞ u2ðxÞ
subject to x 2< n
þ and px   Y
where p is the vector of prices and Y the total potential income of the household.
6
From now on we will refer to the budget set as T. Hence,
T ¼f x 2< n
þjpx   Yg:
With Y and p remaining the same, a household’s expenditure pattern can change if z
changes, causing a shift in the balance of power.
Animportantshortcomingofthismodelistheassumptionthatzconsistsofexogenous
variables.Thereisreasontobelievethathmaygetaffectedbychangesinthehousehold’s
choice, x. One variable that is widely acknowledged to be a determinant of h is the
woman’s earning power. In the existing literature – see, for instance, Bourguignon and
Chiappori (1994) and Moehling (1995) – this is captured by the prevailing market wage
for female workers, w1. Hence h is taken to be determined by (among other things) w1.
It is however arguable that what determines the woman’s bargaining power is not just
the female wage rate but what she actually earns. Thus, if e1 is the number of hours the
woman works, then, according to this view, h depends on w1e1. Since e1 will typically be a
variable the household chooses (that is, it is a part of x), h gets inﬂuenced by the
household’s decision.
7 This creates some obvious difﬁculties in modelling household
behaviour since we need some technique for taking account of this feedback effect.
4 This is, of course, a simplifying assumption. The power of a woman, like status, is a multi-dimensional
concept and in a larger study there would be a compelling case for distinguishing different varieties of it. A
woman may have  access  to resources in the household, without having any  control ; a woman may have a
lot of power in the kitchen, but little outside; see Mason (1986) for a discussion.
5 The second National Family Health Survey, 1998–9, in India has a wealth of information on female
autonomy. A preliminary look at the data suggests that a sharp rise in female autonomy occurs if the female
happens to be self-employed. Since the self-employment is the result of deliberate decision, this fact
lends support to the claim, made below, regarding the endogeneity of h.
6 That is, Y is the income that would occur if everybody worked all the time.
7 In Basu et al. (2002) we allowed for a more general kind of endogeneity, whereby a person can share
one’s literacy with other members of the household to enhance their income and household power, and
found corroboration for the theory in the behaviour of households in Bangladesh.
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able to suppose that whether or not h depends on the wage rate per se, it must also
depend on what the woman in the household actually earns. A traditional woman
whose social norms prevent her from working surely has less power than a woman who
actually works, despite the fact that both may be living in the same region and so
confronting the same market wage rate w1. There is also some anthropological and
sociological evidence – see, for example Mencher (1988) and Riley (1997) – that a
woman’s actual contribution to the household budget inﬂuences how much say she has
in household decision making. In other words, even if it is the woman’s working in the
household or the household farm or her taking responsibility for caring work that
enables her husband to go out and earn a wage, she will not have as much power as she
would if she did the actual earning herself; see the evidence from Karnataka, India,
provided by Desai and Jain (1994); see also Blumberg and Coleman (1989).
8 It is worth
noting, however, that the general model developed here would remain valid whether a
woman’s outside work increased her power or decreased it. The basic feature of the
model that follows is that it allows for feedback from decision to power.
To keep the model as general as possible at this stage, assume that h depends not just
on z but also on x. Hence, we may write h ¼ h(z,x).
The household’s maximand, as before, is:
XðxÞ¼hu1ðxÞþð 1   hÞu2ðxÞ: ð1Þ
The problem now is that h itself depends on x. So if for a given balance of power
index, h, the household maximises X and chooses x, this may in turn cause h to change.
So the household may want to adjust x further.
A natural  equilibrium  idea (Basu, 1999), is the stationary point of this process. To
deﬁne this formally, let us ﬁrst describe the solution to the household’s maximisation
problem as x ¼ g(p,Y,h). In other words,
gðp;Y;hÞ argmax
x2T
½hu1ðxÞþð 1   hÞu2ðxÞ :
Here is our crucial deﬁnition of how a household behaves in equilibrium.
Deﬁnition. Given (p,Y, z), a household equilibrium is an index of power, h , and a vector
of goods, x , such that h  ¼ h(z,x ), and x  ¼ g(p,Y,h ).
Hence, given the exogenous variables p, Y and z, if we want to predict how a
household will behave, we have to identify the household equilibrium (h , x ). The
household’s behaviour is given by x  and its balance of power is given by h . Of course,
there may be more than one equilibrium. This is discussed in Section 4. An alternative,
game-theoretic interpretation of household equilibrium occurs in the next Section.
The ﬁrst question that needs to be answered before we venture to examine the
properties of household behaviour is whether and under what circumstances a
8 As Zelizer (1994, p.140) notes in the context of American labour,  No matter how hard they worked or
how much their families depended on their labours, women’s housework was deﬁned – and valued – as an
emotional task, but hardly of material import. 
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turn out to be sufﬁcient to guarantee existence.
Theorem 1. Assume
(i) h(z,x) is continuous in x,
(ii) ui is strictly concave, continuous and satisﬁes vector-dominance (i.e.
x > x0 ! ui(x) > ui(x0)) and
(iii) Y > 0 and p 0.
Given these assumptions there must exist a household equilibrium.
Proof. Assume (i)–( iii) are valid. It will, ﬁrst, be shown that is a function (rather
than a correspondence).
Let x, x0 2 T ¼f ^ x 2< n
þjp^ x   Yg; and let k 2 (0,1).
X½kx þð 1   kÞx0 ¼hu1½kx þð 1   kÞx0 þð 1   hÞu2½kx þð 1   kÞx0 
> h½ku1ðxÞþð 1   kÞu1ðx0Þ  þ ð1   hÞ½ku2ðxÞþð 1   kÞu2ðx0Þ ;
since ui is strictly concave
¼ kXðxÞþð 1   kÞXðx0Þ:
This shows that X is strictly concave. Since u1 and u2 are continuous, X is continuous.
Hence X must achieve a maximum at some unique value of x in the domain T. This
establishes that g(p,Y,h) is a function; and, with p and Y ﬁxed, we can think of it as a
function on the domain [0,1].
Fix the values of z, p and Y.
We shall deﬁne the mapping
u : T  ½ 0;1 !T  ½ 0;1 
to be a response function if, for all (x, h) 2 T   [0, 1], u(x, h)   (x0, h0) is such that
x0¼ g(p, Y, h) and h0 ¼ h(z, x).
Given Assumption (iii), T is non-empty. Hence, T   [0, 1] is non-empty and
compact. By Assumption (i), h is continuous. It is obvious that is continuous in h.
Hence, u is a continuous function. By Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem, there exists (x ,
h ) such that u(x ,h ) ¼ (x ,h ).
It is easy to verify that a ﬁxed point of the response function constitutes a household
equilibrium.
With the formal model and results behind us, we are now in a position to explore the
implications of our model of household behaviour in various special contexts. The
purpose of the immediate next Section is to consider not just an interesting special case
but also to study the game-theoretic foundations of the household equilibrium. It is
possible and some readers may prefer to skip directly to Section 4.
2. Game-theoretic Interpretation of Household Equilibria
Two natural modiﬁcations worth introducing in the above model are, ﬁrst, dynamics
and, second, some game-theoretic considerations in identifying equilibrium behaviour
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behaviour identiﬁed through such an exercise has interesting connections with the
 household equilibrium  discussed in Section 1.
It seems reasonable to assume that empowerment is not an instantaneous event. A
woman used to being dominated in the household is unlikely to become powerful
immediately if the circumstantial conditions change in her favour. The process needs
time. This seems more plausible with the collective approach, as distinct from the Nash
bargaining model of the household, in which the outcome is a direct consequence of a
bargain based on the threat point, and, as such, we would expect the outcome to
change as soon as the underlying conditions change. The collective approach, by
leaving the exact nature of decision making in the household fuzzy, has the advantage
of permitting power to change gradually in response to changes in its determinants.
Let us capture this by assuming that a households  power index in period t, h
t,
depends on the determinants of power in the previous period, z
t 1, and x
t 1. We will
assume that z
t is unchanged over time and so we may suppress it, without loss of
generality. Hence, what we have just assumed may be written as:
h
t ¼ hðxt 1Þ: ð2Þ
I shall refer to this as the  power function .
Now let us suppose h
0 denotes a household’s index of power in period 0, which may
be referred to as the initial period. In period 0, this household chooses a consumption
bundle x
0, by doing the kind of maximisation described above, with the power index
set equal to h
0. This in turn determines the index of power in period 1, h
1 ¼ h(x
0). In
period 1 the household chooses x
1 by maximising X(x) in (1), with h being treated as
equal to h
1. And so on in periods 2, 3 and beyond. How can we predict what a
household’s proﬁle of power and consumption over time (that is, respectively, h
0, h
1,...
and x
0, x
1,...) will look like?
Thenaturalwaytodothisistothinkofahouseholdasengagedinplayinganextensive-
formgame.Butifwearetotakethecollectiveapproachtothehousehold,asmodelledby
Chiappori, Bourguignon (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994)
and others, seriously and want to model it as a game, we face a serious problem: who are
the players? Note that in the collective approach the agents are the man and the woman
butthedecisionistakenbyamythicalhybridthatisaweightedaverageofthemanandthe
woman.ThelineItakeisofthinking ofthishybridastheplayer.Hence,ifinperiodt,the
household’s index of power is given by h
t, we will think of the player making a choice in
period t as someone endowed with the preference h
tu1(x) þ (1   h
t)u2(x). Once this is
done there is no loss of generality in referring to h
t as the player in period t.
9
Admittedly, this is a somewhat unusual approach. A more conventional approach
would treat the man and the woman as two players and conceive of this as a standard
extensive form game. But that would amount to an outright jettisoning of the collective
model of the household. If one wishes to retain the spirit of such models as a realistic
9 Observe that we are using the symbol h both as a number in [0,1] to denote the index of power and as a
function h : T ! [0,1] which, given x 2 T, computes the index of power (recall T is the budget set, deﬁned in
Section 1). This is expositionally convenient and should cause no confusion since it will be obvious from the
context whether h is being used as a number or to denote the power function.
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combine cooperative and non-cooperative elements. Ligon (2000) does this by using
asymmetric Nash bargaining and combining that with non-cooperative game theory.
10
What I am proposing here is to use the collective model of the household as an apt
description of a single period, and then to build this into a dynamic model. What is
interesting is that, by pursuing this line of inquiry, one can tell a rigorous game-
theoretic story, which is, at the same time, not the standard extensive-form game.
Complication arises from the fact that this player will naturally assess future returns
in terms of its own preference. Suppose a household’s consumption over time is given
by the sequence fx
tg. Assuming that all agents have a discount factor of d 2 [0,1), a
player h’s aggregate (present value of) payoff is given by
A½h;fxtg   
X1
t¼0d
t½hu1ðxtÞþð 1   hÞu2ðxtÞ : ð3Þ
Since h 2 [0,1], and each such h is being thought of as a player, the set of potential
players in this game is inﬁnite and given by [0,1]. Each player can at most play in one
period
11 but of course he looks at the entire future stream of returns in choosing his
strategy. The intuitive idea behind the equilibrium strategy that will be formalised is
that the household that chooses in period t does so in the awareness that households
that will come into existence in the future may not have the same preference as itself.
And it evaluates the consumption stream over time that gets generated by the choices
in each period in terms of its (current) preference. This is in keeping with the literature on
rational decision making by an agent, whose preference changes over time and who is
aware of this. As Strotz (1955, p. 173) wrote in his classic paper,  [It is] rational for the
man today to try to ensure that he will do tomorrow that which is best from the
standpoint of today’s desires ; see Sally (2000), for critical evaluation of this principle.
In order to formalise this, let us begin by noting that each player h s strategy is to
choose a consumption vector x from the budget set T.
Hence, the strategies of all players may be denoted by
f : ½0;1 !T:
Hence, each such mapping denotes a strategy tuple, which speciﬁes the strategy of
every player.
What I now want to do is to identify an equilibrium strategy for every player. In order
to do this deﬁne D(h
0,x,f ) to be the aggregate (present-value of) payoff of a player
h
02[0,1], who chooses a consumption bundle x 2 T, and when the other players (from
then on) are committed to playing strategy f.
If we start from an initial power index, h
0, and the household employs a strategy
tuple, f, we can generate the household’s consumption path fx
tg, in an obvious manner,
by repeated application of f and the power function h as described in (2). Thus x
0 ¼
f(h
0) and x
t ¼ f[h(x
t 1)], for all t 1. We will use P to denote such a function that
converts the pair (h
0, f) to a consumption path. Thus P(h
0,f)¼fx
tg, as described above.
10 In Ligon’s analysis the bargain takes the form of a sharing rule for all future periods. Unlike in my
description, his model yields outcomes which are ex post Pareto optimal (though, interestingly, even in his
model the outcome may not be fully Pareto optimal).
11 If the same h occurs in more than one period, we treat the h in the various periods as distinct players.
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x 2 T, deﬁne hx;f^ xtgi to be the consumption vector fx
tg such that x
0¼x and, for all
t 1, xt ¼ ^ xt 1. Now, we can formally deﬁne
Dðh
0;x;f Þ Aðh
0;hx;P½hðxÞ;f  iÞ: ð4Þ
To understand this note that if this player h
0 chooses x now, in the next period the
player that comes into existence is h(x) (by (2)). Since players are committed to playing
f, the consumption stream that occurs from then on is given by P[h(x),f].
The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is now easy to deﬁne.
Deﬁnition. f  :[0,1]!T is a subgame perfect equilibrium if, for all h 2 [0,1],
D½h;f  ðhÞ;f    Dðh;x;f  Þ; for all x 2 T:
The next Theorem points to an interesting connection between the idea of a
household equilibrium and subgame perfection.
Theorem 2. If (x , h ) is a household equilibrium, and the dynamic household game has a
subgame perfect equilibrium, f  , then it must be the case that f  (h ) ¼ x .
Proof. Let f   be a subgame perfect equilibrium and (x ,h ) a household equilib-
rium.
Step 1.Observe that D(h ,x ,f  ) D(h ,x,f  ), for all x 2 T.
This may be deduced as follows.
Dðh
 ;x ;f  Þ¼h
 u1ðx Þþð 1   h
 Þu2ðx ÞþdDðh
 ;f  ðh
 Þ;f  Þ½since hðx Þ¼h
  
 h
 u1½f  ðh
 Þ  þ ð1   h
 Þu2½f  ðh
 Þ  þ dD½h
 ;f  ðh
 Þ;f   
½since h
 u1ðx Þþð 1   h
 Þu2ðx Þ h
 u1ðxÞþð 1   h
 Þu2ðxÞ;8x 2 T 
¼ D½h
 ;f  ðh
 Þ;f   
  Dðh
 ;x;f  Þ;8x 2 T½since f   is subgame perfect :
Step 2.Step 1, coupled with the fact that f   is subgame perfect implies
Dðh
 ;x ;f  Þ¼D½h
 ;f  ðh
 Þ;f   :
Step 3.We will now prove x ¼f  (h ). Suppose this is not the case. That is,
f  ðh
 Þ ^ x 6¼ x . Using the equation derived in Step 2, we have
h
 u1ðx Þþð 1   h
 Þu2ðx ÞþdD½h
 ;f  ðh
 Þ;f   ¼h
 u1ð^ xÞ
þð 1   h
 Þu2ð^ xÞþdD½h
 ;f  ½hð^ xÞ ;f   :
Since x  is the unique optimum for player h  in a one-period problem, this equation
implies
D½h
 ;f  ðh
 Þ;f   < Dðh
 ;f  ½hð^ xÞ ;f  Þ:
This is a contradiction. Hence x ¼f  (h ).
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in particular, be interested in consumption paths generated by subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies, that is, in P(h
0,f  ), where f   is subgame perfect, and h
0 is the
index of power that occurs at the start.
From Theorem 2 it is clear that if f   is a subgame perfect equilibrium and (x ,h )i sa
household equilibrium, then P(h ,f  ) ¼f x g, where fx g is a sequence in which for all
t, x
t takes the value of x .
Let us call fx
tg a stationary consumption path, if there exists t 0 such that, for all t t0,
x
t ¼ x, for some x. So what I have just shown is that (h , f  ) generates a stationary
consumption path where the household settles down on the household-equilibrium
consumption level.
Are there other consumption levels (that is, ones which are not a part of a
household equilibrium) on which the household can stabilise in a subgame perfect
equilibrium? I shall now show that the answer to this is yes, and this is so in an
interesting way. In particular, a household can get trapped in a Pareto sub-optimal
consumption level (that is, a consumption level where both the husband and the wife
are worse off than some x 2 T). What is interesting is that this occurs in a model
where households are modelled along the  collective approach , which was ostensibly
developed to capture the idea that even if members of the household have differing
objectives the household will be efﬁcient. It is here shown that, introducing dynamics
can result in strategic manoeuvering, which traps the household in inefﬁcient situ-
ations. Hence, the present model could be viewed as a way of reconciling the col-
lective household approach of Chiappori, Bourguignon and others with Udry’s
(1996) ﬁnding that households typically fail to achieve Pareto optimality; see also
Lundberg and Pollak (1994), Ligon (2000) or Duﬂo and Udry’s (2003) ﬁnding that
members of households in Cote d’Ivoire fail to insure one another fully (which leads
to inefﬁciency).
12 It is worth clarifying, however, that the Pareto sub-optimality result
obtains not purely from allowing the power of the wife to depend on variables that
are chosen by the household but from combining this with dynamics; see Browning
et al. (2004). Nor is this result obtained by the direct method of allowing the use of
violence within the household.
13
To demonstrate the Pareto sub-optimality claim, it is useful to reduce the above
model to a special case. Consider a case where there are three goods. The number of
units of apples consumed by the wife is x1; the number of units of apples consumed by
the husband is x2; and the amount of work done by the wife is x3.
14 Let us assume that
the husband always works and that gives the household an income of y (>0); u1(x)¼
12 And for a more extreme statement, delivered with a literary ﬂair social science cannot match, here is
August Strindberg in his The Son of a Servant (translation by E. Sprinchorn, Anchor Books, 1966 edition,
p. 20), revealing an unexpected grasp of the idea of returns to scale:  But the family was and still is a very
imperfect institution....A restaurant could serve hundreds with hardly any more members on its staff.  And
later, going a bit overboard (p. 24):  The Family! Home of all social evils, a charitable institution for indolent
women, a prison workshop for family breadwinners, and a hell for children! 
13 The domestic violence argument is, however, more complex than appears at ﬁrst sight. If, instead of
actually using violence to gain favours from his wife, a man used the threat of violence, then the outcome
would still be Pareto optimal. The same would be true if the man got direct pleasure from violence. This
warns us that Pareto optimality should not be used as a sufﬁcient condition for making welfare judgements.
14 Earlier leisure was used as an argument of the utility function, with work entering indirectly, as one
minus leisure. The change of notation in this example is for expositional convenience and harmless.
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depends solely on the wife’s (husband’s) consumption. Neither of them care about the
wife’s leisure in itself. Assume u(0) ¼ 0, u0(xi) > 0, u00(xi)<0, i ¼ 1,2; x3 2 [0,1]; the
price of apples is 1 and the wage rate for 1 unit of work is 1. In addition, assume
h ¼ hðx3Þ¼ 0i f x3 ¼ 0
1i f x3 > 0.
 
ð5Þ
I have chosen a discontinuous function purely for simplicity.
15
In any particular period, for a given h, the household’s welfare is given by
huðx1Þþð 1   hÞuðx2Þ
where
x1 þ x2   y þ x3:
Given this budget set, the feasible set of utilities of the husband and the wife, in any
single period, is shown in Figure 1.
Suppose, to start with, h ¼ h
0 ¼ 0. Hence, in the beginning the household’s pref-
erence is the husband’s preference. Now consider the following strategy
f  ð1Þ¼x ¼ð y þ 1;0;1Þ
f  ð0Þ¼x0 ¼ð 0;y;0Þ:
u2
u1
u(y+1)
B
X
u(y+1)
u(y) A
Fig. 1.
15 For reasons of consistency with the assumption used in Theorem 1 some may prefer the use of a
continuous function. This is not hard to do using the following family of functions: Let h ¼ minf#x3,1g,
where # is any number in the open interval from 1 to inﬁnity. Note that each of these functions is continuous
and, as # goes to inﬁnity, the functions converge to (5). It is possible to show that the inefﬁciency result would
be valid for sufﬁciently large values of #.
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her own consumption, whereas if the man is all-powerful he stops the wife from
working and spends all the money they have on his own consumption.
16
If households stick to this strategy, the initial household’s lifetime utility is
uðyÞ
1   d
:
If the initial household deviates, its highest possible lifetime utility is
uðy þ 1Þ:
This is because the best deviation for the man is to make the wife work and spend
the entire household income on himself. However, once the wife works, the power
shifts entirely to her and from the following period his consumption (that is, the
consumption of good 2) goes to zero.
Hence, f   is a subgame perfect equilibrium if u(y)⁄(1 d)>u(yþ1).
Suppose this is true. Then the household that starts at h
0 ¼ 0, will in each period
choose not to send the wife to work and the husband will consume y units of apples.
Hence, the household will in each period be at point A in Figure 1, which is clearly
inefﬁcient.
17
To let the wife work, earn more and consume more in this period, would result in the
man relinquishing power in the next period and so being worse off in the future. If d is
sufﬁciently large so that this is not worth it, then the household prefers to stagnate in
an inefﬁcient outcome. It is worth pointing out that this is in keeping with ﬁndings in
other areas of economics, especially the study of government and other political
institutions; see, for instance, Grossman and Helpman (1994); Milesi-Ferretti and
Spolaore (1994) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). As Besley and Coate (1998,
p. 139) remark, in politics, once you recognise that policy-makers change over time
 efﬁciency issues are then more subtle because preferences extend over the entire
future policy sequence, while policy makers can control only what happens in their
current term .
Another kind of inefﬁciency that is now easy to model is the inefﬁciency of over work.
It is possible to construct an example along the lines of the above one in which agents
of the household work more than they would ideally like to because of their (justiﬁed)
apprehension that to work less would amount to a diminished say in future household
decisions.
It is easy to see that in the above example the household equilibrium is unique and
given by h  ¼ 1 and x  ¼ (y þ 1,0,1). Since f  (h ) ¼ x , this conﬁrms Theorem 2 in
the context of this example. This also suggests that under subgame perfection we could
also have the outcome (h , x ). That is, a household that begins with the woman having
full power, would consume x  and retain this power structure forever.
16 Strictly, f   needs to be deﬁned on the entire domain [0, 1]. But since in this example, h never takes
values in the interval (0,1), we can specify f   on (0,1), arbitrarily.
17 The model rules out, by assumption, the possibility of anybody borrowing money from the market and
persuading (by offering money) the decision-maker of the household to choose differently from what he or
she would have done otherwise.
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pointAinFigure 1.Itmaybeaskedwhytheall-powerfulhusbanddoesnotaskthewifeto
work and make her promise that he will get to consume some positive amount of his
preferred good in all future times. By such an agreement they can move to an efﬁcient
point like B. The answer to this must depend on what view we take of the individual’s
ability to make binding commitments. Of course, if the income earning capacities of the
man and the woman were stochastic – in one period he may be the bread-winner and in
another she may; see Kocherlakota (1996); Ligon (2000); Ligon et al. 2000) – commit-
ments would be easier to maintain. The possibility of your rainy day occurring in the
future would make you share now even though in this period you are worse off sharing.
This would be an equilibrium argument about why commitments bind.
The kind of commitment I am talking about here is, however, one that does not have
any force within a subgame perfect equilibrium. In principle, this kind of a question
arises in virtually every game model in which a subgame perfect equilibrium happens to
be inefﬁcient. Examples abound in industrial organisation theory and political econ-
omy. In models of long-run interaction my inclination is to go with formal game theory.
To relinquish power and then to expect the newly powerful to make concessions in all
future periods seems empirically unrealistic; and to that extent the inefﬁcient outcome
described by point A seems realistic.
3. Female Labour Supply
In some economies, at certain times, women participate in the labour market in large
numbers. Elsewhere they do not. Given that the feminisation of the labour force has
majorimplicationsforaneconomy’sefﬁciencyandprogress,itisnotsurprisingthatthere
is a large body of writing that investigates the determinants of female labour supply.
Whatthis literature has notaddressedbut isgermaneto thismodel isthe fact that female
labour supply is both a matter of household decision and a determinant of the house-
hold balance of power, which in turn, inﬂuences the supply of female labour.
18
The model of Section 2 is well-suited to analysing this problem. It will be shown here
that, once the two-way causality is recognised, the female labour market can be shown
to have multiple equilibria. Hence, two societies which are innately identical can have
very different levels of female labour market participation. It will also be shown that
changes in female labour supply participation in response to shifts in exogenous var-
iables can be sudden and discontinuous. Hence, a society in which women do not work
can remain that way for a long time, with some exogenous variable shifting all the time.
Then as the exogenous variable crosses some threshold level, society can rapidly
change with lots of women coming out of their homes to be active participants in the
labour market. Of course, in reality the speed of these responses will be tempered by
18 And, of course, it may have independent exogenous determinants as well. A woman’s status in the
household and the local labour market can be inﬂuenced by her rights as enshrined in the nation’s laws and
even by the state of the world economy. And certain global and society-wide institutions that may otherwise
 appear to be gender neutral [can] bear and transmit gender biases  (Grown et al., 2000, p. 1148). Some of
these effects can be unexpected. As Dasgupta (2000) has demonstrated in a theoretical model, household
bargaining coupled with market feedbacks can cause greater market opportunity to have perverse feedbacks
on women’s power in the household.
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it is, on pure rationality calculus, may give a somewhat exaggerated picture of the
quickness of adjustment. Nevertheless, it points to certain directions of household
behaviour which have been neglected by the existing literature. It is also possible to
construct – though I resist doing so here – a more complex model in which the
threshold itself gets affected by habit and custom.
In order to focus on the problem of female labour supply, let us in this Section assume
that the man always works, the household consumes only one good and the amount of
workthewomandoes,e,isavariable.
19Theamountofleisure,‘,consumedbythewoman
isgivenby1 e.Letusassume,further,purelyforreasonsofalgebraicsimplicity,thateach
person’s utility function is separable. In particular ui(x,‘) ¼ x   ci(e), i ¼ 1,2, where
c0
i > 0, c00
i > 0. We will also here conﬁne attention to the one-period model of Section 2.
In other words, both the man and the woman value the good the same way, and both
consider the woman’s work onerous, though they give different weights to this.
Admittedly, we are losing some important and interesting details by virtue of these
simplifying assumptions, but for our present purpose the sacriﬁce seems worth it.
The amount of say that a woman has in household decision making will be assumed
to depend on the amount of income she contributes to the household, that is, on ew,
where w is the female wage rate prevailing on the market; and as ew increases, the
woman’s power increases.
20 In brief,
h ¼ hðewÞ;h
0   0:
Given these assumptions the household’s problem reduces to the following.
Max
fx;eg
X ¼ x  ½ hc1ðeÞþð 1   hÞc2ðeÞ 
subject to px   ew þ Y:
Remember that in this Section p and x are scalers. Since the man always works, there is
no loss of generality in assuming that the income from the man’s work is subsumed in Y.
Substituting for x from the constraint (it is easy to see that the constraint will always
be binding) we have the following ﬁrst-order condition:
w
p
¼ hc0
1ðeÞþð 1   hÞc0
2ðeÞ: ð6Þ
Following the deﬁnition in Section 2, (h , e ) is a household equilibrium if it is the
solution of (6) and (7):
h ¼ hðewÞ: ð7Þ
19 If there is open unemployment in the economy and a positive probability of the man losing his job, this
can have interesting effects on e (Basu et al., 2003). By assuming that the market always clears we stay away
from such complications.
20 Citing the work of Blood and Wolfe (1960), Blumberg and Coleman (1989, p.226) observe,  Wives who
worked for wages have more [power] than their housewife counterparts had. Further, the more hours a
woman worked, the greater her decision-making power.  For formal evidence on how household consump-
tion decisions are not separable from the labour supply decision of the man and the woman, see Browning
and Meghir (1991).
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w
p
¼ hðe wÞc0ðe Þþ½ 1   hðe wÞ c0
2ðe Þ: ð8Þ
In analysing female labour supply response to changes in different exogenous vari-
ables it is important to distinguish two different cases
Case I: c0
1ðeÞ > c0
2ðeÞ, for all e.
Case II: c0
1ðeÞ < c0
2ðeÞ, for all e.
I am ignoring the non-generic special case, where the two marginal costs are equal.
Case I is the  normal case  where the woman’s work is more onerous to the woman
herself than to her husband.
21
Case II describes a situation that often prevails in traditional, conservative societies
where a man, for instance, may consider his  pride  hurt if his wife goes out to work.
Since ci consists of not just the cost of being tired out by work but also social and
psychological costs, c0
2ðeÞ can exceed c0
1ðeÞ. Another reason why c0
1ðeÞ < c0
2ðeÞ is because a
woman who works longer hours outside will have less time for work at home and this
could contribute towards a feeling of diminished well-being on the part of the husband.
If this feeling is sufﬁciently strong it could make c0
2ðeÞ very large. We shall refer to Case
II as the  conservative  case.
In Figure 2, ﬁrst consider (7). With w constant, as e increases, h will increase. We shall
call this the  power-earnings curve , since it relates the woman’s earnings to her power.
In the same Figure draw the curve representing (6). We shall call this the  effort-supply
curve , since this represents the amount of effort that the wife will supply. Let us begin
with Case I – the normal case. Since c0
1ðeÞ > c0
2ðeÞ, an increase in h, raises the right-hand
Power-earnings curve 
e 1 e* 0
1
q*
q*
Effort-supply curve 
Fig. 2.
21 Of course, inequality concerning total values does not necessarily translate into similar inequalities
concerning marginal values. But it is possible to argue that, in the normal textbook, model c2 (e) ¼ 0, for all e,
whereas c1(e) > 0, for all e > 0, and its ﬁrst-derivative is positive, since it is person 1 who does the work. Since
this means that c0
2ðeÞ¼0, for all e, the normal textbook model is a special instance of Case I.
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i > 0). Hence, in the normal case
the effort-supply curve is downward-sloping, as shown in Figure 2. The point of inter-
section of these two curves represents the household equilibrium. The woman supplies
e  units of labour and the household balance of power is given by h  in equilibrium.
The equilibrium is unique. Through an easy exercise of shifting curves the reader can
check that in the normal case
(i) a rise in p causes h and e to decline, and
(ii) a rise in w causes h to rise while the impact on e is uncertain
Let us now turn to Case II. It is easy to check that the effort-supply curve is now
upward-sloping. As a consequence, the equilibrium need no longer be unique.
One particular sub-case is illustrated in Figure 3. The effort-supply curve is given by
OABC. Clearly, there are three equilibria at points E1, E2 and E3. Of these, let us focus
on the two stable equilibria, E1 and E3.A tE1 the wife does not work, at E3 she works a
lot. Interestingly, both outcomes are possible as equilibria. In other words, two
households or two societies, one in which women do not work (or work very little) and
one in which they do regular, full-time work, can be ex ante identical households or
societies. Hence, the working and not-working of women need not be reﬂections of
fundamental differences.
22 It is worth emphasising that what has just been demon-
strated is the multiplicity of equilibria within a household. Hence, it is possible for a
society to exhibit variation across households, unless there are homogenising norms at
work, which tend to make all households select the same equilibrium. Since in the
normal case there is a unique equilibrium, it may be interesting to check empirically
whether in more traditional societies there is greater variation in women’s labour force
participation.
An implication of this is that women’s work can respond discontinuously to
changes in exogenous variables. Consider increases in the female wage rate, w. This
Power-earnings curve 
A
E1
E2
E3
e 1 0
1 C
B
q
Effort-supply curve 
Fig. 3.
22 Similar results can be obtained by assuming that women’s work is, in part, a matter of social norm that
can meet with dissonance and psychological costs (Vendrik, 2000).
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right. Hence, if the household was originally at E1, for some time nothing will hap-
pen. Then suddenly the low-work equilibrium will cease to exist, at which point there
is a sudden sharp rise in the woman’s labour market participation. There can also be
a small rise in women’s participation, initially, and then a sharp rise. This would
happen if the effort supply curve at E1 has a positive slope, instead of the inﬁnite
slope, as in the case illustrated in the Figure. Of course the sharpness of the changes
will, in the aggregate, be tempered by the heterogeneity of households that one
encounters in the real world.
This analysis of woman’s work and the feminisation of the labour market was con-
ducted, deliberately, with no reference to biological or innate psychological differences
between men and women. This is not to deny such differences but to demonstrate
the enormous consequences that market processes and equilibrating forces can have.
These can overwhelm biology and create the impression of much larger innate
differences from what is actually the case.
23 The above model may be viewed as
a demonstration of this.
4. A Comment on Child Labour
There are important links between the status of children and the structure of
household decision-making and, not surprisingly, this has been analysed; see
Browning (1992), Basu and Van (1998) and Bardhan and Udry (1999). However,
relatively little has been written about the link between the structure of power in the
household and the status of children. Analysing data from early twentieth-century
urban America, Moehling (1995) has shown that households, where children con-
tribute a larger share of the aggregate household income, are also the households
in which children are likely to get more to consume. Moehling explains this along
the lines of the model constructed in this article. She argues that if one of the
agents in the household happens to be a child, the logic of the model remains
unchanged and a greater income contributed by the child enhances the child’s
power (in the same way that a woman’s power gets enhanced in our model by a rise
in the share of the woman’s income). And this, in turn, leads to a greater con-
sumption by the child.
Browning, Bourguignon et al. (1994), on the other hand, argue that children are
unlikely to have much to say in household decisions. One way of reconciling Moeh-
ling’s empirical ﬁnding with this is to argue that
(i) a woman tends to internalise her children’s preference (that is, her utility
function reﬂects the child’s interest); and
(ii) as the share of the husband’s income in the household decreases, the woman’s
power rises.
23 As Sen et al. (2002) point out, even in matters of health, where biology does play a differentiating role,
women’s lower social autonomy and constructed disadvantage can exacerbate and overwhelm the biological
differences.
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consumption on the part of the child without the mediating fact of empowerment of
the child.
The aim of this Section is not, however, to join this debate but to study the relation
between a household’s power structure and its propensity to send its children to work.
It will be shown that the connection between the household power structure and the
incidence of child labour is much more intricate than it appears at ﬁrst.
24
Let me begin by adding some special assumptions to the model of Section 2, so as to
pare the focus down to the essentials. An important assumption that seems to be
realistic and will be maintained here is that both the husband and the wife feel that
their child’s labour is painful and undesirable. However, they have differences when it
comes to deciding on what to spend the additional household income that their child’s
labour may bring.
25 A simple algebra for capturing this assumption is as follows. Both
the man and the woman consider the cost of child labour to be
ci ¼ cðhÞ; c0 > 0; c00 > 0; ð9Þ
where h is the amount of work done by the child. On the other hand, the woman is only
interested in spending money on good 1 and the man’s sole interest is good 2. We
could, for instance, think of 1 as milk and 2 as alcohol. (This is, admittedly, an insulting
and stereotypical depiction of gender difference, though it is not evident who should
feel more insulted by this characterisation, the man or the woman.) Hence, using xi to
denote the number of units of good i consumed by the household, we can write agent
i s utility function as:
ui ¼ uðxiÞ cðhÞ; ð10Þ
where u0 > 0, u0  0. It is being assumed that the amount of work done by the adults is
ﬁxed. Hence, the household’s maximand, following the model of Section 2, is given by:
X ¼ huðx1Þþð 1   hÞuðx2Þ cðhÞ: ð11Þ
Taking the price of each good to be 1 and the wage rate of child labour to be w,t h e
budget constraint is given by
x1 þ x2 ¼ hw þ w1 þ w2: ð12Þ
The extent of child labour that the household supplies can now be determined by
solving the problem of maximising (11) subject to (12).
An intuitively interesting result emerges in the special case where u(Æ) belongs to the
following class of functions:
uðxiÞ¼xa
i ; where 0 < a   1: ð13Þ
24 This is particularly interesting because in other dimensions (i.e. other than labour), the connections are
believed to be interesting but straightforward. It has been seen in developing countries, for instance, that
when the woman has greater say in household matters, the children’s nutrition improves (Thomas, 1990). I
would conjecture, though, that even in some of these other areas, such as child nutrition, careful theoretical
analysis will lead to predictions of a non-monotonic response to changes in household balance of power. It
would then be interesting to check these empirically.
25 I adopt the language of there being one child in each household purely for algebraic simplicity.
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case (when a ¼ 1).
Theorem 3. In the model described above, with u(.) belonging to the class deﬁned by (13),a s
the woman’s power, h, increases (starting from 0), child labour declines; but as h continues to rise
(beyond 1/2), child labour rises.
Proof. Using (12) to substitute for x2, the household’s problem reduces to
Max
fx1;hg
huðx1Þþð 1   hÞuðhw þ w1 þ w2   x1Þ cðhÞ:
The ﬁrst order-conditions are given by:
hu0ðx1Þ¼ð 1   hÞu0ðhw þ w1 þ w2   x1Þð 14Þ
wð1   hÞu0ðhw þ w1 þ w2   x1Þ¼c0ðhÞ: ð15Þ
Using (14) and (15) we get
whu0ðx1Þ¼c0ðhÞ: ð16Þ
Hence, we can treat (15) and (16) as the ﬁrst-order conditions. To see the effect on h
of changes in h, let us take total differentials of (15) and (16):
wð1   hÞu00ðhw þ w1 þ w2   x1Þðwdh   dx1Þ dhwu0ðhw þ w1 þ w2   x1Þ¼c00ðhÞdh
whu00ðx1Þdx1 þ wu0ðx1Þdh ¼ c00ðhÞdh:
Solving these two equations for dh/dh we get:
dh
dh
¼
ð1   hÞu00ðx2Þu0ðx1Þw   hu0ðx2Þu00ðx1Þw
ð1   hÞu00ðx2Þc00ðhÞþhu00ðx1Þc00ðhÞ hð1   hÞw2u00ðx1Þu00ðx2Þ
where x2 ¼ hw þ w1 þ w2   x1.
At this point, we need to consider separately the case where a < 1 and the case where
a ¼ 1 (which leads to a corner solution).
First consider the case where a < 1. Since u(Æ) is strictly concave and c(Æ) strictly
convex, the denominator is always negative. Hence the sign of dh/dh is the same as the
sign of the term
X   hu0ðx2Þu00ðx1Þ ð 1   hÞu00ðx2Þu0ðx1Þ: ð17Þ
Using (13), (17) can be rewritten as:
X ¼ a2ða   1Þhxa 2
1 xa 1
2   a2ða   1Þð1   hÞxa 1
1 xa 2
2 :
Clearly, this has the same sign as the term (1 h)/x2   h/x1/Z.
Next note that (13) and (14) imply h=x1 ¼ð 1   hÞxa 1
2 =xa
1. Substituting this into the
expression Z we can see that Z (and, therefore, X) has the same sign as 1 (x2/x1)
a.
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then x1 > x2, and, hence, X > 0.
Now consider the case where a ¼ 1. Then (11) may be rewritten as
X ¼ hx1 þð 1   hÞx2   cðhÞ: ð18Þ
Hence, if h > 1/2, the household will spend all its income on good 1. Hence, in that
case the household will choose h so as to maximise X ¼ h(hwþw1þw2) c(h). This is
obtained by inserting (12) into (18), after setting x2 ¼ 0. Hence, from the ﬁrst-order
condition we have hw ¼ c0(h). It follows that, as h increases, h will increase (recall
c 00(h) > 0). Likewise, if h < 1/2, a rise in h causes h to fall.
The theorem implies that the relation between a woman’s power and the amount of
child labour is U-shaped, as illustrated in Figure 4. This is interesting because it is
counter-intuitive. Given that an all-powerful husband and an all powerful wife lead to
the same amount of child labour, we would expect power-sharing to make no differ-
ence to the incidence of child labour. But, as the theorem shows, that is not true. A
household that has reasonable gender-symmetry (in terms of household power) out-
performs (in using this term I am obviously treating child labour as a  bad ) asymmetric
households.
The intuition is straightforward. Recall that both the man and the woman ﬁnd it
painful to send the children to work; but they have different preferences concerning
what to spend any additional household income on. Consider now the special case in
which the powers of the man and the woman are fairly well-matched, that is, h is close to
half. Since both the man and the woman are averse to sending their child to work,
changes in h will have little effect on the calculation concerning the cost of child
labour. On the other hand, the beneﬁts of the additional income generated by sending
the child to work will not be fully reaped by any agent, since h being close to half will
mean a tussle between milk and alcohol. Hence, neither the man nor the woman will
0
1
1
Incidence of 
child labour, h 
Incidence of Child Labour 
q, fraction of household
income earned by the
mother
Fig. 4.
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the child will be less likely to work. On the other hand, if h goes to 1 or to 0, one agent
becomes powerful and so he will reap the full beneﬁts of child labour and he will
therefore also be more inclined to make the child work.
In closing it is worth emphasising that the result of the U-shape could be violated if
the utility function and the labour cost functions lie outside the class described here. If,
for instance, we assume what is often presumed to be true, namely, that women are more
sensitive to the pain of child labour, then the amount of child labour will be less when
h ¼ 1 than when h ¼ 0. In that case the incidence of child labour curve, instead of
being U-shaped, as in Figure 4, would be tau-shaped, that is, a U, with the right-hand
upturn being less sharp than the left-hand downturn. Moreover, if we go beyond the
class deﬁned by (13) and assume, for instance, u000< 0, then the child labour graph can
be shown to be an inverted-U.
In other words, while it is interesting to recognise that the response of child labour to
changes in the balance of power may be not merely nonlinear but non-monotonic, the
theory does not give us an unequivocal prediction of the nature of this relation, but
merely  conditional  propositions. This underlines the importance of empirical work in
this area. If we are to design policies that control child labour by inﬂuencing the
balance of power in the household, then it is important to conduct empirical research
to get a ﬁner view of the broad and conditional hypotheses that theory gives us.
5. Conclusion
The article was motivated by the recognition of the fact that while a household’s
balance of power inﬂuences its choices, the choices can in turn affect the household’s
balance of power. While this feature of households is well recognised in the descriptive
and sociological literature, it has been formally modelled relatively rarely and usually
for special contexts. Much of the present article was devoted to modelling this two-way
relation generally and in deriving its implications for female labour supply, child labour
and other aspects of household behaviour. This article may be viewed as spadework for
further work in modelling household behaviour.
We could try to build a Nash bargaining model of the household, which allows for
asymmetric power and recognises that not only does the extent of asymmetry and the
threat point affect household decisions but they themselves get affected by the deci-
sions.
A more radical direction of research would be as follows. The sociological literature
draws our attention to another lacuna of the theoretical models of the household, that,
at a subliminal level, we all know, namely, that the balance of power within households
often manifests itself in the domains of control. In other words, a woman’s say, captured
in our model by h, is recognised to vary depending on the domain of decision making.
She could have all the power when it comes to choosing the children’s clothing and
food, but have no say in other matters. A budget may be apportioned to her for
expenditures in her domain, with or without additional restrictions being placed on
her by her husband; see Guyer (1988) and Duﬂo and Udry (2003).
One existing model that has elements of this idea is that of Lundberg and Pollak
(1994) – see also Carter and Katz (1997). They begin by observing correctly that Nash
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be the threat point. The threat point does not have to be deﬁned by utilities obtained
in the event of a divorce but could be the payoffs obtained in a non-cooperative
equilibrium. So in their model the man and the woman retreat to their domains in the
event of the bargain breaking down. What I am suggesting here is that the idea of
domains of control may be more germane to household decision making and not
merely a feature of a breakdown in cooperation. In this approach a woman’s power
would be reﬂected in part by the size of the domain of her decision. Such a model
could raise intricate game-theoretic questions, since how one person chooses over her
domain will clearly depend on how she expects the other to choose over his domain
and vice versa and, also, the contours of the domains could themselves be endogenous.
These are some of the next steps to take in the research venture to map the structure of
decision making and power in the household. And they can inﬂuence in an important
way how we design policy pertaining to poverty removal, the eradication of child
labour, unemployment and social welfare.
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